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Abstract -------------------------------
This paper is an attempt to assessing the costs and benefits for Europeans from their empires 
overseas over five centuries, in particular, the net economic gains from empire over the long 
19th century when mercantilism was replaced by free trade and over the period of reintegration 
and de-colonisation brought by the two World Wars. Paradoxically while empires were 
growing, empires were at best economically irrelevant for European long run growth in a free 
trade world. The post-1914 era shows that the benefits from imperial trading blocs were sub-
optimal solutions compared to open international trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Our essay will critically survey a growing volume of publications by historians which attempt 
to evaluate the costs and benefits for Europeans, flowing from some five centuries of involvement with 
empires overseas. That involvement began with the conquest of Cueta by the Portuguese in 1415 and 
passed through two epochs: 1415-1815 and 1815-1974. After a first conjuncture marked by the French 
Revolution and a quarter of a century of global warfare, Britain emerged as the hegomic imperial power 
in Europe and its major rivals for commerce and dominion in Africa, Asia and the Americas (portugal, 
Spain, France and Holland) ceded control over parts of their possessions overseas to Britain or (in the 
cases of Spain and Portugal)~ lost sovereignty to local movements for independence in South America. 
Before 1815-25 struggles for commerce, maritime bases, populations and territory overseas had 
persisted with frequent interludes of warfare for nearly four centuries. Thereafter, and as the 
mercantilist pursuit of power and profit subsided and was replaced by the liberal discourse of free trade, 
intellectuals began to question the whole enterprise and to construct national balance sheets for the 
acquisition and retention of empires overseas. 1 In historiographical terms, an overwhelming share of the 
published history of European imperialism and expansion overseas is concerned with the epoch of 
mercantilism 1415-18152• Our survey proposes, however, to concentrate (vide parts 3 and 4) upon the 
macro-economic cost and benefits of empires as they evolved during the long 19th century, 1815-1914, 
and over the period of reintegration and decolonization inaugurated and brought to a close by a second 
conjuncture - the world wars of the twentieth century. 
1 Wood, British Economists 
2 See the massive bibliographies included in the new series edited by Russell-Wood, An Expanding World 
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2. Europe's Macro-Economic Gains from the First Age ofhnperialism 1415-1815 
The first epoch of European imperialism began with the colonization of Cueta in 1415 and 
ended with the Treaty of Vienna when France, Spain, Portugal (even Holland) virtually lost most of 
their empires overseas. Yet at that conjuncture" it was obvious that without some four centuries of the 
expansion of European power into Africa, Asia and above all into the Americas, all the economies of 
Europe would have been poorer, the composition of their national products would have been more 
agricultural and less industrial in form and lower proportions of their workforces would have been 
employed in industry and resident in towns. Over time Europeans had made gains from imperialism 
that took the tangible form. of: foodstuffs, raw materials, minerals and manufactured commodities 
imported from other continents that flowed into European ports - falteringly at first - but rapidly when 
their prices and costs fell after 1650. The list includes: tropical groceries (pepper, cinnamon, cloves, 
nutmegs, ginger, cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, groundnuts and tobacco); basic foodstuffs (fish and fish oils, 
maize, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, chillies, rhubarb; botanical medicines (cocaine, quinine, narcotics); 
industrial raw materials (hardwoods, raw silk, cotton fibres, furs, wax, indigo, cochineal and other 
dyestuffs); manufactures (porcelain, jewels, textiles); and above all gold and silver from Southern 
America3 
Yet the macro economic significance and ramifications of these concrete manifestations of 
bounty from trade and empire remains difficult to analyse and impossible to quantifY. Several 
European industries were based upon import substitution for products originally brought in from Asia 
and the Islamic world - including silk, cotton textiles, porcelain and jewellery. Furthermore, capital 
formation, the establishment of firms and the employment of labour had occurred to process the raw 
materials imported from other continents into European ports; and that had led on to the development of 
new industries including: silk and cotton textiles, the dyeing, printing and finishing of cloth, furniture 
made from hardwoods, sugar refining, coffee roasting, tobacco processing and chocolate making. 
3 Fischer, McInnis and Schneider (eds. ), The Emergence of a World Economy 
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Imported spices, chillies, tomatoes, coffee, tea, cocoa and above all sugar, not only brought diversity 
into monotonous European diets but (together with the curative and energising properties of such 
botanical medicines as: tea, rhubarb, quinine, and fish oils) raised propensities and capacities to labour 
among national workforces. More significant were the calorific additions to basic food supplies and the 
contingent growth of populations and cities promoted by the introduction of maize and potatoes and 
from fish (caught in distant Atlantic waters). Feedbacks from imperial trades to the expansion of such 
major ports as Seville, Cadiz, Lisbon, Antwerp, Amsterdam. Bordeaux, London, Bristol, Glasgow and 
Hamburg, and to the shipbuilding, shipping, commercial and financial services that fonned an integral 
part of their development and of the prosperity of their hinterlands are still visible today.4 
Although massive imports of precious metals from the Americas and Africa are considered by 
historians to have constricted prospects for the long run economic development of Spain and Portugal, 
bullion turned out to be instnnnental for the development of a European and an international monetaty 
system.5 Minted into coins and widely accepted as collateral for instruments of credit and paper 
circulation, silver and gold from Southern America and marginally from Africa, provided the basis for a 
necessary expansion in the supply of national and international money. Without that flexibility and 
because strategic goods and primary produce from Baltic economies could not be covered by 
commodity exports, intra-European trades from Northern to Western Europe and the Mediterranean 
would surely have been constrained?6 
Trade with China, India and other parts of Asia could also have been seriously constricted 
because for long stretches of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, approximately three 
quarters of the commodities purchased in Asia could not be covered by revenues received from Europe's 
5 
6 
Braudel, The Perspective of the World 
Forsyth and Nicholas, 'The decline of Spanish Industry'. pp. 601-10. 
Steensgaard, 'Commodities, bullion and services', pp. 9-24 
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commodity exports?' Bullion flowing into Iberia acted as the dollar of the day. Europeans obtained the 
silver they needed to trade with the Baltic, Asia and with each other because the Iberians ran deficits on 
their balance of payments accounts. That stabilised European economies and facilitated their gradual 
transfonnation.8 
Furthennore, Hapsburg power (funded by American silver) checked the thrust of Ottoman 
imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Balkans. (Turkish armies stood at the gates of 
Vienna twice: in 1529 and again in 1683.)9 Meanwhile, the pretensions of Charles V and Philip n to 
universal monarchy (also backed by spoils from the New World) reinforced the traditional conviction of 
Europeans that politically their continent should evolve as a multi-state system and not into some new 
holy Roman empire ruled from Madrid, Vienna or Paris. IO Europe's peculiar state system with its 
rivalries and expensively maintained balance of power contributed positively to economic growth by 
promoting diffusions of people and capital and of knowledge and technologies across frontiers. 11 
In complex ways the imperialism of the mercantilist era helped to place the already 
interconnected economies of Western Europe upon a path that, by 1914, provided their populations with 
markedly higher standards of living than the rest of the world. Nevertheless, arguments that reify 
European expansion overseas into the engine of economic progress should be strongly qualified. For 
example, that particular motor (conquest and trade) did little to promote industrialisation in the Iberian 
peninsular.12 Historians of Spain and Portugal now seem more inclined to present their nations' early 
and sustained connexions with empires in Asia and the Americas as being responsible for their slow 
transitions to industrial market economies.13 France (or rather its western ports and hinterlands) derived 
some clear benefits from investments in transatlantic trade and colonisation during the eighteenth 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
Steensgaard, 'Commodities, bullion and services, pp. 9-24 
O'Flynn and Giraldez (eds.), Metals and Monies 
Parker, 'Europe and the wider world', pp.161-195 
TilIy, Coercion. capital and states 
Jones, The European Miracle, pp. 1 04-53 
Yun-Casalilla, 'The American empire and the Spanish economy' pp.123-57 and Pedreira, 'To have 
and have not', pp. 93-122. 
Pedreira, 'La economia Portuguesa', pp. 219-52, and Thompson, and 
Yun-CasalilIa (eds.), The Castil/ian crisis 
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century. Potential returns to France declined sharply, however, when the Bourbon State lost Canada and 
its foothold in India during the Seven Years War. 14 They dwindled to insignificance after the destruction 
of the rich plantation colony of Haiti and the loss of other Caribbean islands to Britain during the wars 
from 1793-1815.15 For more than a centuIy the United Provinces successful exploitation of the 
opportunities offered by intercontinental commerce and colonisation aroused the antagonism of rivals, 
particularly Britain and France, who used military and naval force to weaken the Republic's power and 
its economy.16 Dutch merchants and capital then played a role in helping Britain to rise to a hegemonic 
position in the expanding global economy. 17 
Yet even for England (where industrialisation between the Civil War and the victory for free 
trade some two centuries later can be most clearly associated with imperialism), the macro economic 
significance of its benefits should not be exaggerated. IS Yes: a high but not a dominant share of all the 
extra industrial output manufactured in Britain during the early stages of industrialisation, 1660-1815, 
was exported overseas; mainly to the Americas, Asia and Africa. To that we should add a proportion of 
the exports sold to other European countries, who derived their capacities to spend on British goods 
from their own participation in world trade. 19 Profits from servicing global commerce helped to fund the 
expansion of British industry, to promote investment in internal transportation, to develop financial 
intermediation, to expand distribution and other networks closely associated with industry. They 
promoted the growth of housing and social overhead capital required to support the extraordinary 
growth of London and other port towns. British merchants became successful entrepreneurs, bankers 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Butel and Crouzet, 'Empire and economic growth', pp. 177-194. 
Bute~ 'France, the Antilles and Europe', pp. 153-74. 
Emmer, 'The economic impact of Dutch expansion', pp. 157-76. 
Dr Vries and Van der Woude, 'The first modem economy' 
Engerman, 'British imperialism in a mercantilist age', pp.195-234. 
Cuenca-Esteban, 'The Rising share of British industrial exports', pp. 153-74. 
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and members of Parliament. They lobbied aristocratic govenunents to create the fiscal, legal and 
institutional conditions for the more efficient operation of commodity, capital and labour markets. 
Receipts from exports procured strategic imports including (timber, pitch, tar, hemp and bar 
iron), as well as important raw materials - such as silk, flax, cotton, dyestuffs and sugar. Imported 
luxuries (tobacco, tea, alcoholic beverages and high quality textiles) provided incentives for harder 
work, fed customs duties into the Exchequer and fimded the powerful navy required for the security of 
the realm, for the protection of trade and territorial expansion overseas. 20 
Nevertheless, other (and probably more significant) endogenous factors also continued to 
operate, including: the kingdom's highly productive agriculture, its deposits of cheap energy and the 
accumulation of a skilled workforce capable of inventing, developing and working with new machinery. 
Britain had participated in intra European trade, and in the exchange of scientific and technical 
knowledge for centuries before Columbus, Da Gama and other navigators embarked upon their voyages 
of discovery.21 Finally, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars depressed the economies, interrupted 
the trade and virtually put an end to the empires of all British competitors, particularly France, but also 
Spain and Portugal. At the Congress of Vienna an Austrian General observed that "Great Britain has no 
greater obligation to any mortal on earth than this ruffian (Napoleon). For through the events which he 
has brought about, England's greatness, prosperity and wealth have risen high. She is mistress of the 
sea and neither in this dominion nor in world trade has she a single rival to fear".22 
20 
21 
22 
O'Brien and Engerman, 'Exports and the growth of the British economy', pp. 177-209. 
O'Brien, 'Inseparable Connections', pp. 53-78. ' 
Cited by: Kennedy, The rise and fall', p. 123. 
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3. European Empires during the Liberal International Order, 1846-1914 
Once the Revolutionmy Wars faded into history, liberal intellectuals returned to the argument 
that since the balance of power within Europe had been secured and because the international 
economic order was moving towards free trade, the retention (let alone expansion) of empires could 
only be counterproductive for the vitality of Europe's economies. Such arguments had appeared in the 
writings of Adam Smith in the 1770s and in Jeremy Bentham's considered polemic, "Emancipate Your 
Colonies", presented at the ?utbreak of war in 1793.23 For several decades in the nineteenth century 
"Cobdenite" recommendations for severing formal political ties between European states and their 
colonies overseas received something like a sympathetic hearing from statesmen and public opinion. 
Unfortunately, for decade after decade following the loss of the Iberian colonies in Southern America 
(and particularly during the high tide of European imperialism (1882-1903», empires continued to 
expand under hoeral, conservative and autocratic governments alike. Denmark, Sweden and Holland 
sold colonies overseas to Britain, France and the United States and concessions towards local self 
government marked political relations between metropolitan governments and their "empires". 
Nevertheless, no territory was actually given up until after the Second World War. Thus, in 1815 
Europe and European possessions and settlements overseas occupied 55 per cent of the world's surface, 
in 1878, 67 per cent, and by 1914 (when the only parts of the world that had never been colonised 
included China, Japan, Siam, Arabia, Tibet, Mongolia and Turkey) that ratio had risen to an astonishing 
84 per cent 24 
23 
24 
Gomes, Foreign Trade and the national economy, p. 63. 
Bergesen, Studies ojthe Modem World System. p.237-238, and 
Clark, The balance sheet ojimperialism. pp. 23-28. 
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Expansion overseas (and overland) came virtually to a close with the outbreak of destructive 
warfare among the great powers, 1914-18 - a conjuncture which marked the beginning of the end 
of five centuries of European imperialism. For a brief interlude between 1846 and 1914 (and in a 
context of a viable international order for the conduct of great power politics and peaceable conditions 
for transnational economic relations), the costs, as well as the benefits of empires, were analyzed in 
order to inform national and international debates concerned with the political, economic and moral 
basis of the commercial and imperial policies pursued by major European powers.2S That discourse 
has latterly been revived in the writings of economic historians of Western Europe and is concerned to 
evaluate and to measure linkages between imperialism overseas and the vitality of several 
metropolitan economies. Historians have used a matrix of national accounts to analyze connexions 
between empires and the macro economic growth of several domestic economies including: balance 
of payments data, estimates of returns on private capital invested in colonies, emigration and the 
allocation of taxes levied upon metropolitan societies for purposes of preserving the security of states 
and their national possessions overseas. 26 In theory the scale and significance of such linkages 
(emerging through flows of: trade, capital, labour and expenditures by metropolitan governments on 
defence and other imperial objectives) could be quantified and assessed in terms of their impact upon 
the long term growth of any European economy.27 Less direct connexions flowing from an "imperial 
elements" in the formulation of a (theoretically separable) set of "purely domestic" fiscal, monetary 
and strategic policies are usually discernible but hardly quantifiable. While more subtle influences 
shaped by the "infiltration" of an imperial dimension into national politics, cultures, institutions, 
consumer preferences, simply promote unresolvable debates in an ongoing appraisal of European 
empires. 
25 
26 
27 
Porter, Critics of empire. 
Nunez (ed.), Debates and controversies in economic history 
Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire. 
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Meanwhile, shares of commodity exports and imports sold to and purchased from several 
European empires seems to be the only comparative indicator currently available to compare the 
economic significance of dominions, colonies and dependencies before 1914. Trade flows and other 
partial indicators reveal that the macro economic significance of empire for the rise, growth and decline 
of the British economy remained far greater and persisted for longer than it did for any other nation in 
Europe with the possible exception of Portugal. 28 The loss of colonies in Southern America, which 
severely curtailed the involvement of the Spanish economy with empire after 1825 may even have had 
beneficial effects upon Spain's long run rate of economic growth. 29 Although the Spanish State retained 
and renewed its commitm~t to its remaining colonies for several decades in the 19th century, any 
potential for gains from colonialism dwindled to insignificance after further losses of Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines - to the United States in 1898. Since the economic consequences of these losses 
now look "small", Spanish historians can suggest that the gains from their retention over the 19th 
century were of comparable significance.30 In the twentieth centwy Spanish colonies included some 
limited and some poorly endowed territory in north and central Africa but the nation's long tradition of 
imperialism left a malign heritage of protectionism, nationalism and militarism, which did much to 
prolong the retardation of the Spanish economy until the 1960s?1 
French aspirations to rival Britain as an imperial power suffered serious setbacks in the wars of 
1756-63 and 1793-1815. Thereafter France regained ground and assets in Africa and Asia and over the 
century to 1914 rebuilt an empire which in area, natural resources and population, ranked a poor second 
to Britain.32 In terms of macro economic significance the post 1815 French empire may have 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Bairoch, Economics and world history. 
Prados De La Escoura, De imperio a nacion crecimiento 
Fraile and Escribano, . 'The Spanish 1898 disaster', pp. 265-90 
Clarence Smith, 'The economic dynamics of Spanish colonialism', pp. 71-88 ~ 
The British empire was nearly three times the area of the French empire - Clark, 
The balance sheet of imperialism, pp. 23-28 
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contributed even less to domestic economic growth than the empires of Holland and POrtugal.33 For the 
majority of European economies (particularly Italy, Gennany and Belgium) who entered into 
imperialism in its final phase 1892-1903, but also for other states which had retained rather small and 
economically insignificant territories and populations overseas) the economic case for any involvement 
in colonization over the 19th centwy now lacks any expost credibility.34 Even at the time economic 
justifications for imperialism looked spurious simply because the shares of their national wealth and 
populations included within the boundaries of the poorly endowed empires of latecomers was tiny and 
any potential losses of national income (emanating even in worst case scenarios from disengagement) 
could only have been negligi~le.3s 
Liberal observations that the overall scale of imperial enterprise had become rather tangential 
for Italian, German, Belgium, Spanish, Portuguese and French economic progress, carried less currency 
for the Dutch and even less conviction for the British cases - if only because the material gains from 
empire looked tangible for certain regions, industries and for politically powerful groups within those 
Protestant kingdoms. Nevertheless the overall economic significance of empires for the long run 
development of these two economies (indeed for any national economy) is best exposed by a three 
column tabulation designed to show the relative scales (ratios) of commodity, factor and fiscal flows 
within the home economy compared to flows to and from the domestic economy and its empire which 
can in turn be contrasted with flows between the home country and the rest of the international 
economy. In every European case, for which data is available, interconnexions through (i) the export 
and import of goods and services, (ii) migration, (iii) net flows of funds on invested overseas (interest, 
profits and dividends) and other economic links with the rest of the world economy look immeasurably 
more important than links with empires. Even for Britain (the European economy most interconnected 
with its colonies and dominions overseas) economic relations with countries and territories outside the 
33 
34 
35 
Brunschwig, Mythes et realites de l'imperialisme colonialfrancais 
Snyder, Myths of empire ~ 
Especially for Italy see Federicko 'Italy's late and unprofitable forays into Empire' 
pp. 377-402 
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empire remained more important by a large, if diminishing, margin throughout the long nineteenth 
century, 1815-1914.36 
This data is relevant for the counterfactual question of how and to what extent might the 
development of particular economies have changed if European states had relinquished political control 
over their colonies and dependencies overseas sometime before 1914? Probable sequences can only be 
discussed by specialist historians with the empirical knowledge required to engage in conjectures about 
paths and patterns of national (including colonial) economic histories that they understand. Pessimistic 
scenarios generate assertions that: colonies granted independence could have fallen into anarchy (a 
popular British perception of India in Victorian times); that independence would have led to higher 
tariffs against exports from metropolitan and other European economies; that colonies uncoupled from 
imperial rule could only have developed more slowly and thereby lowered overall levels of world 
Some combination of protectionism with slower growth seems to be a more realistic conjecture 
to pursue. On this assumption a paradigm paper by Edelstein offers estimates for the short tenn decline 
in national income that might counterfactually, have followed from loss of political control over the very 
largest of European empires overseas - the British empire. His estimates come to somewhere between 
1.6 per cent and 4.3 per cent of national income for 1870 and 4.9 per cent to 6.5 per cent for 1913. 
These ratios are not small. They depend, however, upon a specified set of assumptions about tariff rates, 
e1asticities of demand and levels of trade that might have been obtained in the absence of British rule 
and influence. This implies they are upper bound numbers because the resources used to produce 
exports for the colonies are assumed to have zero opportunity cost and are not reallocated, in Edelstein's 
heuristic model to their second best alternative uses.38 Yet the example of Spain after the loss of Cuba, 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico in 1898 shows how quickly Spanish exporters recovered from the 
36 
37 
38 
Bairoch, Commerce exterieur is the best source for European data we used - see 
Nunez (ed.) Debates and controversies, pp. 42-53 
The taxonomy of these arguments is critically appraised in Cain, 'Was it worth having', pp. 351-376 
Edelstein, 1mperialism: cost and benefit', pp. 197-216 
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sudden loss of protected markets.39 There is no reason to suppose that the more flexible and efficient 
export industries of Britain. France and Gennany (even Portugal) would not have adjusted even more 
readily to a "phased withdrawal" from empire or any involvement in imperial enterprise over the second 
half of the long nineteenth century.40 
For that period it is, moreover, difficult to find examples of imports from European empires that 
could not be procured from non imperial sources at similar and (for several' exploited' European 
populations) at lower prices. To sum up: plausible estimates for the net benefits derived by the British 
and other economies from trade with their empires suggest that after mid century the net benefits could 
not have been other than "sm~" - possibly as low as 2 per cent of gross national products. If that 
argument can be sustained for Britain, it follows that during the liberal order, the gains from trade 
accruing to European economies with a far more limited involvement with empires (especially Italy, 
Gennany and Belgium) but also Portugal, Spain. France (and even for Holland) could be represented as 
negligible and dispensable.4! This conclusion does not preclude interesting variations across countries, 
changes through time or deny that colonial markets and sources of supply could be important, for some 
European regions (such as ruraI Castile); for some cities (e.g. Barcelona and Amsterdam) and for 
particular industries, (Catalan cotton textiles, Portuguese shipping and for ship building, and textile 
production in Holland) and the fact that the gains accrued elite groups in Europe who profitted from the 
retention of empires.42 The multiplication oflocal examples does not, however, aggregate to macro 
economic significance. 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Fraile, Industrializacion 
Lains, A Economia Portuguese 
The Dutch case is perhaps almost analgous to the British - Van der Eng, 
'Exploring exploitation', pp. 235-264 
Doyie, Empires 
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Proponents of empire (then and now) insist, however, that the diffusion and maintenance of a 
liberal international economic order depended on the Pax Britannica, which in turn rested upon the 
existence of a British Empire, and that Europe's gains from trade (flowing from the survival of that 
empire) must have been correspondingly greater. They will claim that local economies in Asia, Africa 
and Southern America could have become less developed and more delinked from international trade 
and specialisation in the absence of colonial rule.43 Writing after decolonisation, historians from other 
continents dismiss these views as Eurocentric and are inclined to counterfactuals that posit optimistic 
scenarios for the growth of d~colonized territories.44 
Other elements of the balance sheets include the flows of benefits accruing from the migration 
of labour and the investment of capital in Europe's empires overseas. For labour, the British empire 
acted as a safety valve for the unemployed and source of upward mobility for ambitious and potentially 
unruly Celts from Scotland and Ireland. As places of settlement for underemployed agricultural labour, 
Italian and Spanish colonies turned out to be disappointing venues for emigration and the large scale 
migration to Cuba only occurred after that colony became independent. Return flows of remittances 
seem to be higher from migrants employed in the United States and the independent republics in 
Southern America 45 
Two features of intercontinental factor flows now seem reasonably clear. Firstly, neither 
colonies nor dominions emerge from British, Dutch, French and Italian statistics as particularly well 
favoured destinations for emigrants or for the flow of savings placed outside their home economies by 
British or Dutch, let alone by French, Portuguese and Spanish investors.46 
Secondly, the admittedly sparse data from business history lends no support to Leninist 
assertions that by the late nineteenth century imperial outlets had become necessary to stave off 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Kennedy, The rise andfall of the great powers. 
See Blaut, The Colonizers model of the world, and Adas, Machines as the measure of men 
Sanchez A1onso, Las causas de la emigracion 
Baines, Emigration from Europe. 
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diminishing returns to capital invested within Western Europe.47 It also undermines the countetpart 
assumption that "supemonnal" profits accrued to funds placed within safer imperial locations, where, in 
theory at least, colonial power could have been deployed to secure "exploitative" rates of profit for 
European capitalists.48 Tabulations for British, French and Dutch stocks of capital invested overseas in 
the early twentieth centwy do not display any marked preference on the part of European investors for 
imperial compared to foreign locations.49 And although there are examples of extremely high profits 
accruing to risky private ventures in several European empires, modal rates of return on either portfolio 
andlor direct investment do not seem (on admittedly limited evidence) to have been extraordinary. so 
Meanwhile, there is, a much debated view that the massive outflows of investible funds 
allocated to the rest of the world (including the British and French empires) operated to retard the 
structural adjustments required for the long term growth of domestic industry in Western Europe. In 
short there is now a presumption for the United Kingdom and France (and perhaps also for Portugal and 
Holland) that significant shares of both public and privately funded capital formation undertaken to 
acquire, develop and defend imperial possessions overseas may have generated sub optimal returns and 
slower growth for some European economies. That is why Hobson's prediction, (made as early as 1902), 
that investment at home (or overseas in independent countries outside European empires) would turn out 
to be a superior allocation of capital for a nation's economic growth seems unequivocally clear for 
Gennany and Italy whose imperial assets were expropriated without compensation following defeats in 
the two world wars of the twentieth century.51 Spanish property in Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico was not expropriated by the United States in 1898 and the measurable losses from that defeat do 
not appear to have been particularly large. 52 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
Barratt Brown, The Economics of imperialism 
Fieldhouse, Economics and empire 
Davis and Huttenbuck, Mammon and the pursuit of empire 
Bairoch, Economics and world history 
Hobson, Imperialism and Federicko, 'Italy's late and unprofitable forays into empire'. 
Fraile and Escribano, 'The Spanish 1898 disaster', pp. 265-90. 
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Fiscal balance sheets must also be scrutinized. After 1873 taxes levied to retain, expand and 
defend the British, French, Portuguese and Dutch possessions overseas increased at rates which worried 
governments and strengthened the case made bi liberal critics that the costs of empires to metropolitan 
taxpayers may have exceeded the benefits that they received by discernible and growing margins. 53 Alas 
(and despite an abundance of budgetary records), for most states the "fiscal burdens" of empire are not 
simple to define, amenable to measurement and are certainly not easy to relate to compensating streams 
of economic, strategic psychic and other benefits from empire accruing to metropolitan economies and 
societies over time. 
Annual outlays made by metropolitan governments on behalf of their empires can usually be 
estimated. Very large shares of public expenditure for this purpose consisted of the military and naval 
costs of imperial conquest, pacification, and thereafter for law and order and the defence of colonies and 
dominions from threats of enemy attack. fuitial or threshold costs of acquiring territory, bases, popu-
lations and resources overseas usually appear in national fiscal data as once and for all outlays on 
warfare (e.g. as the costs of say an Algerian, Maori or Ethiopian war). Pacification could, however, 
take many years and the opportunity costs of manpower and other resources "used up" in conquest are 
usually regarded as bygones by governments, prone to draw lines under past records of profligacy. 
Unless expenditures by upon conquest had been funded by borrowing, they matured in official 
perceptions and accounts into "sunk" costs and usually disappear from view.54 Except that is, in the 
British case where the presence throughout the liberal era of a extraordinarily large national debt with 
massive debt servicing obligations (absorbing 56 per cent of tax revenues in the 1820s), serves to remind 
historians how costly the acquisition, extension and retention of the British empire had been. ss 
53 
54 
55 
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Although acceptable assumptions can be made in order to estimate governmental allocations 
for their empires, the problems of reclassifying the military and naval expenditures made by European 
states into annual outlays "required" for the defence of the metropolis and its overseas trade on the one 
hand, and expenditures incurred for the protection of possessions, located beyond the borders of national 
states on the other, are not easily SUImOunted. What seems clear (with the possible exceptions of India 
and Indonesia) is that the economies and populations of nearly all European colonies and dominions 
contributed very little towards the costs of their own defence from external aggression or from internal 
insurrection. Furthermore, Pt some cases (e.g. Italy and Portugal) a scrutiny of budgetary accounts 
reveals that the taxes levied upon indigenous populations and economies covered only fractions of all 
public expenditures incurred for civil administration and public investment in infra-structural facilities 
and services required for their governance. S6 
Expenditures by the European governments on troops, sailors, weapons, equipment, 
fortifications, bases, warships, etc. might in theory be divisible into the proportions required for the 
defence of the metropole and its trade on the one hand and allocations for the protection of its dominions 
and colonies overseas on the other. In practice that distinction became more blurred in the perceptions 
of kings, statesmen, admirals and generals responsible for strategic planning. Furthermore, historians of 
the Romanov and Habsburg empires are prone to argue the distinction is without real historical meaning 
or sense for empires overland. 
In 1936 Grover Clark produced some data designed to show that annual expenditures by the 
British, French, Italian, German and Japanese governments on the formation of capital in their colonies 
and upon the armies and navies required for the protection of imperial commerce exceeded by a large 
margin any possible gains from imperial trade. For example in one of his calculations, Clark assumed 
that the expenditures by the French government on the military and naval capacity required to protect 
56 Lains, An account of the Portuguese African empire', pp.235-264 and Federicko, 'Italy's late and 
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commerce with its empire would be proportionate to the share of total French trade conducted with the 
colonies between 1894 and 1934. To that sum he added direct expenditures by the French government 
on civil expenditures in the colonies. His figures show that total outlays funded by taxpayers amounted 
to 21 % of the gross value of the total colonial trade. 57 Other historians have complicated and 
lengthened the fiscal balance sheet by arguing that the "voluntary" contributions of manpower and other 
resources made by the dominions and colonies towards the defence of France and Britain in the course 
of four years of warfare against Germany and the Central Powers, 1914-18, represented some 
recognition that the metropole had borne the burdens of imperial defence in peacetime and could not be 
expected to meet the entire cO,st of repelling German armies and navies in wartime. S8 
Loyalty to the motherlands matured into priceless assets, but that does not imply that empires 
carried "disproportionate" shares of the costs incurred to defeat the Kaisereich, or that wartime 
contributions from the colonies and dominions somehow (and in clear economic terms) compensated for 
the higher levels of taxation imposed on British, French, Dutch and other citizens for imperial defence 
for many decades before 1914. Furthermore, persistent obfuscation of any clear distinctions between 
defence of motherlands and the protection of imperial assets overseas led to a political and cultural 
context in which for several decades before the Great War, Britain's strategic planning remained too 
detached from involvement with the balance of power on the mainland of Europe. British statesmen 
failed to forge the diplomatic alliances and to build up the military forces required to deter German 
aggression. On this kind of open-ended diplomatic accountancy, British, French and Dutch pre-
occupations with empire overseas can be represented as failures of the liberal imagination, which added 
up to the most costly strategic error in European history. 59 
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These arguments will run and run. Meanwhile, it is surely pointless to deny that the extension 
and defence of European empires against threats of eXternal aggression and internal subversion cost 
metropolitan taxpayers real money; and that throughout Europe such burdens increased following the 
unification of Germany in 1871. Furthermore, -the incidence of such taxes was not calibrated to fall 
upon the incomes of taxpayers who derived most of the material gains from state expenditures on 
possessions overseas. All in all the fiscal costs of European empires are not easily defined or measured 
because public goods, like defence and diplomacy cannot be readily accommodated into a framework of 
cost-benefit analysis. There seem to be several unknowns, too many unpriceable externalities and 
strategic ramifications that ar~ too widespread for the categories to contain measurable, as distinct from 
plausible, propositions about the allocations of metropolitan taxes for purposes of acquiring and 
maintaining empires overseas. 
Resources could certainly be wasted in futile imperial conflicts and squandered in unprofitable 
diplomatic incidents (e.g. the wars between the United States and Spain in 1898 and Russia and Japan in 
1904 as well as the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911) 60 Yet before 1914 the volume of resources 
allocated year after year by European governments specifically and clearly for the maintenance and 
defence of empires could not have constituted anything other than smallish shares of their national 
products. Represented in the most unfavourable light as lost opportunities for investment within 
metropolitan economies, the shares of domestic capital formation hypothetically foregone must have 
been relatively large in the British case and much smaller for other European powers.61 
To sum up: between 1846-1914 European powers extended, maintained and defended empires 
overseas "on the cheap". Radicals at the time suggested, (probably correctly) that a phased withdrawal 
from formal rule would not have resulted in diminished gains from trade, lower returns on investment 
overseas, or any closure of opportunities for emigration. Historians now recognize that some (but 
perhaps no sharp) reductions in tax burdens might have followed from decolonization. In a free trade 
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world of integrating factor markets and stable arrangements for international payments, at best empires 
had become economically irrelevant for the long run development of Europe. 62 Paradoxically, empires 
were growing. Colonial disputes certainly played their part in the slide towards the most costly war in 
our continents history basically by obstructing and obfuscating the fonnulation of diplomatic and 
strategic in policies required to maintain a balance of power in Europe. 
4. Global Warfare. Neo Mercantilism and the Reintegration of European Empires from 1914 to the 
Treaty of Rome 
The Great War, whi,ch effectively brought European expansion overseas to an end, can be 
represented as the third significant conjuncture (after 1492 and 1789) in the history of imperialism. Four 
years of destruction ended with Treaties of Versailles and Sevres, which (like the Treaty of Vienna a 
century earlier) redistributed the provinces and colonies of defeated nations (this time Germany and 
Turkey) among the victors, France, Britain and Italy; dismembered the Hapsburg Empire and created the 
independent republics of Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from territories of the Romanov 
Empire. 
In 1919 victorious European states assumed responsibility for larger empires and dependencies 
at a time when the international economic order began to move rapidly away from the unregulated 
arrangements for commodity trade, capital movements, technology diffusion, labour migration and 
transfers of payments across frontiers that had characterised international commerce for several decades 
before 1914. Of course, tendencies towards a "new protectionism" can be observed in the laws 
effecting foreign trade and payments promulgated by several governments between 1876 and 1914. 
Almost everywhere, (including Britain), lobbies and ideologies, worked to undennine the liberal order 
that had promoted integration and more efficient international economic relations for three decades after 
1846. Although free trade had existed only as an "untried utopia" and political constraints on flows of 
62 Williamson, 'Globalization, convergence and history', pp. 277-306 
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commodities, services, capital, labour and technology around the world economy certainly increased 
over the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in general tariffs and other controls remained bounded 
enough to allow for the continued expansion of international commerce and factor mobility right down 
to the outbreak of war in 1914. Indeed the years 1899-1913 witnessed an upswing in the growth of 
trade, capital flows and migration that was only surpassed in scale and intensity by the famous, long 
boom, 1948-73, that formed the economic background to decolonization after the Second World War. 63 
Before the Great War opportunities to trade and invest within the international economy as a whole 
continued to be relatively unconstrained and economic arguments for closer imperial integration that 
emerged even before the end of the nineteenth century, did not seem compelling enough to shift 
European commercial policies in radically new directions. For more than a decade after la fm de siecle, 
the appeal of empire looks more atavistic and xenophobic than material.64 
Unfortunately, the Great War pushed almost all European economies towards autarky, 
constricted the political boundaries of commodity and factor markets and reintroduced serious militaIy 
considerations into the discourse about the costs and benefits of empires. That occurred because during 
and in the wake of war, sales of exports, the procurement of food, raw materials and militaIy goods, the 
recruitment of manpower from protected and secure sources of supply provided by colonies had become 
"strategic necessities". 
Colonial contributions to the metropolitan war effort cannot have accounted for more than a 
small fraction of the resources allocated by the victorious alliances of Britain, Russia, America, France 
and other European powers to defeat Gennany and the Central Powers in the First World War. 
Nevertheless, a war on that scale is not easily factored out of economic assessments of empire. At very 
least, the course, costs and consequences of the Great War altered European perceptions and changed 
the and parameters within which the economics of empires came to be discussed. First and foremost 
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ideological and popu1ar support for strengthening imperial connexions became far stronger as a resu1t of 
bonds forged during four to five years of shared sacrifices for the defence of mother countries. Ties 
with kith and kin and an already deepening sense of responsibility towards "our" people and territories 
overseas all intensified in wartime. Secondly, the war disrupted intra-European trade and factor flows 
and promoted moves towards autarky across countries and led to greater degrees of reliance on imperial 
trade and investment among those European nations (Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) who could opt for alternative possibilities for trade - within the frameworks of political 
security, protection, commercial regu1ation and monetary arrangements provided by networks of 
colonies, dependencies and qominions overseas. Thirdly the enormous costs incurred by European 
economies to mobilise for war and to demobilise for peace, the massive destruction of capital assets and 
the lost generations of dead and disabled workmen amounted to a sum roughly equivalent to four to five 
times Europe's national output for 1913. 6S Even on the most favourable assumptions about prospects for 
renewed growth after the war, losses of that magnitude would have taken a generation to make up. 
More rapid rates of recovery often depended upon importing capital goods, raw materials and skilled 
manpower, which rendered foreign trade and/or capacities to borrow on international money markets 
even more important after than they had been before the Great War. 
Unfortunately that expensive conflict not only depleted Europe's stocks of physical and human 
capital but seriously dislocated the system of international trade and payments upon which investment 
and future growth had depended. For many years after 1918 international economic relations continued 
to be afflicted by the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, by state controls enacted to wage war and 
above all by the malign legacies of financial strategies pursued by governments to fund massive 
expenditures on their azmed forces between 1914-18. Although taxes per head had more than doubled in 
real terms) European states had borrowed most of the money they needed for warfare from their banks. 
Thus the problems of how to squeeze inflation out of the system and how to bring national price levels 
65 Bogart, Direct and indirect costs of the Great War 
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and paper currencies back into some kind of sustainable relationship with one another emerged as the 
major preoccupation of statesmen and central bankers in the post war years. 66 Their difficulties were 
compounded by the conjoined problems of inter-allied debts and GeInlan reparations. Political 
disagreements about the status of these debts led to recrimination among former allies (as well as deep 
resentment in Germany), which complicated the already difficult task of reconstructing an international 
trade and payments system. 67 
War also reinforced tendencies to protectionism, latent but evident before 1914. For example, 
the Versailles Treaty provided for the dismemberment of three multinational free trade empires and the 
creation of new states in Ewope with autonomous control over tariffs and foreign trade. Cut off by 
blockades and exorbitant transportation costs from supplies of manufactured imports, a long list of 
countries embarked upon programmes of accelerated import substitution. At the close of hostilities 
when nationalist governments found their young industries under threat from renewed international 
competition, they raised tariff barriers. Self sufficiency in foodstuffs and raw materials, which also 
became a matter of national security in wartime, proved politically difficult to reverse once peace 
returned. 68 
While it would be impossible to predict how the international order might have developed 
without the catastrophe of the Great War, from the vantage point of that long boom in the world 
economy, from 1899-1914, there would seem to be no need to be other than optimistic about future 
prospects. Growth rates for production and foreign trade, for migration and capital flows across 
frontiers, had attained record levels. European economies seemed to be adjusting to ,the realities of 
international competition, including the appearance of Japan but more importantly to the rapid rise of the 
United States, which as early as the 1890s had emerged as the hegemonic industrial power of the 
twentieth century. 
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Europe's decline in relative terms became much more of a problem after a war which had 
witnessed massive destruction of human and physical capital, the exhaustion and pillage of the German 
and Austrian economies and the economic chaos which attended revolution in Russia Meanwhile, 
wartime shortages had promoted the more rapid rise of several new industrial economies: notably the 
United States but also Canada and Japan and several economies in South America 69 Called upon to 
face discontinuous jumps in the competitive position of American industry at a time of disorder in 
international economic relations, heightened levels of protection and recovery from the most costly war 
since Napoleon proved in th~ event to be too difficult for European capitalism and liberalism. By the 
1930s the system had succumbed to depression, communism, fascism and to the implementation of 
programmes for imperial integration.70 
Such programmes, forged during the war and evolving throughout the 19205, came to the top of 
political agendas in the wake of the Great Depression and after the failures of statesmen and central 
bankers to reconstruct a viable international economic order, free from inflation with stable rates of 
exchange, moderate levels of protection and minimal interference by governments with flows of 
commodities, capital and labour across frontiers. Thus for several European economies (Britain, 
France, Portugal, Spain and Italy) imperial integration appeared as a viable substitute for a more open 
international order at a time when the growth of world commerce had slowed right down and trade 
across frontiers became afilicted with degrees of risk and instability not witnessed since the mercantilist 
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Then for the third (or perhaps the fourth time if thirty years of conflict over religion, 1618-48 is 
included in the chronology) another world war and its aftermath during the 'forties led on to rapid 
closure in the long history of economic political relations between European states and their colonies, 
assets and possessions overseas. Most of the changes in nature and scale of these connexions that 
flowed from the Second World War, 1939-45, (and the post war period of recovery) mirrored the 
experience of the Great War and its aftermath.72 
For example, Spain and Portugal had remained neutral during both world wars. But in the 
great depression in the 1930$ and during the period of warfare and recovery from destructive warfare 
that afflicted the international economy in the 1940s, their dependence on colonies as markets and as 
sources of supply for food, raw materials, minerals and fue~ increased as markedly as anywhere else in 
Europe. 73 Although Spain's connexions with its empire was much less than Portugal's, Franco's military 
rebellion which plunged Spain into civil war and isolation was launched from (and during its early 
stages funded with hard currency provided by) Spanish colonies in Africa 74 
Between 1939-45 the manpower and resources of the entire British Empire were once again 
mobilised to defeat the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Austria, Italy and other axis powers on 
battlefields, airways and sea lanes in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. Such assistance in times 
of grave national danger had always been deeply appreciated but its magnitude has not yet been 
measured in terms that might provide us with a precise idea of its economic significance. Meanwhile, 
the heritage and frequently revived memory of the empire's contribution to: victory in two world wars; 
to the stabilisation of the home economy during periods of instability and depression between the wars; 
and to Britain's recoveries after 1918 and again after 1945 evolved into omnipresent parts of the 
political culture informing and moulding strategic, monetary, fiscal and commercial policies pursued by 
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successive British governments between the wars and for several decades after 1945.75 
Imperial preferences, fiscal subsidies and exemptions, sterling areas, commercial treaties, 
bilateral arrangements, programmes of aid and development and exchange agreements all became a 
much stronger and a steadily more constricting framework of "imperial" laws, rules and regulations 
within which the British economy operated after 1914.76 
Responding in more or less similar ways to changes in the balance of power, to seminars and 
prolonged disruptions, to the liberal international economic order and to the existence of industrial might 
on the continent of North America, governments in France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Italy also 
embedded their domestic economies in treaties, regulations, agreements, regulations and monetary blocs 
designed to foster imperial integration.17 For some continental societies (notably France but also 
Belgium) the heritage of empire and the positive role played by their colonies in the defeat of Germany 
again formed part of popular sentiment in favour of "France outre mer".78 In other countries, especially 
Britain (but also Italy under Mussolini), pretensions to great power status were conceived to be 
dependent upon the possession of empire or upon the traditions and influence required to "line up" a 
commonwealth of states that had once been colonies.79 For long stretches of the 20th century the 
cultures and politics of imperialism reinforced strategic and economic pressures on European 
governments to make much more of their empires. 
Meanwhile, the Cobdenite discourse in favour of free trade and for disengagement from empires 
faded but it did not die away. Indeed antipathies to empire embodied in classical liberalism became 
complemented by socialist doctrines with their sympathies for movements for colonial freedom that 
emerged in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean between the wars. Nevertheless, the post 1914 climate of 
hostility and suspicion among states, the depressed state of world trade and the almost universal trend 
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towards the political regulation of international economic relations, all combined to lead governing 
elites to conceive of empires as solutions to their strategic problems and domestic economic 
difficulties.80 Cobdenite prescriptions for disengagement from empires became as remote from centres 
of power and policy as the sennons of socialists preaching for colonial freedom. 
For every set of national data that is available related to commodity trade, to the sale and 
purchase of services, to flows of investment and labour overseas, (as well as national surveys on the 
operation of monetary systems and payments), evidence of closer integration between metropolitan 
economies and their colonies and commonwealths overseas seem unmistakable. Of course, degrees of 
integration varied and became far less obvious in, say, the Dutch than the French case.81 Nevertheless, 
on most indicators, trends towards imperial integration (which began during the Great War) gained 
momentum during the world depression of the 1930s. They reached their apogee during and for roughly 
a decade after the Second World War, when a dislocated international economy and severe shortages of 
hard currencies (especially dollars) increased the dependence of European powers on their colonies and 
commonwealths. 
Thus, during more than four decades of warfare, neo mercantilism and instability, 1914-58, 
European states turned (perhaps in the long stream of history we should say returned?) to their colonies 
and dominions for strategic help and economic assistance. Perhaps the availability of easy imperial 
options diverted the attention of statesmen away from the more difficult problem of reconstructing an 
international order? Nevertheless, contributions from empires to the security of mother countries and to 
the stability and growth of metropolitan economies was perceiVed at the time (and has been represented 
by many historians since) as positive and significant. For long stretches of the twentieth centuxy, as 
agendas, Cobdenite and socialist prescriptions against empires looked increasingly unreal. 82 
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Simply as a prelude to European decolonization, imperial reintegration still seems worth 
considering within the matrix of national accounts because it can only be represented as a second best 
solution to problems created by war and to the -dislocation of the liberal international economic order. 
Thus, intra-imperial trade and flows of investment conducted within systems of preferential tariffs, 
currency blocs, multi-lateral bargaining and political arrangements, which prevailed for roughly forty 
years after 1914, can be represented as sub-optimal solutions, compared to open international trade. 
Such systems certainly generated some gains from exchange and specialisation. Imperial commerce 
did, moreover, represent an. improvement on the dominant alternative of the period - national and 
regional tendencies towards autarky - particularly when colonies could be induced (or even forced) by 
metropolitan governments to participate in exchanges on wider markets. Nevertheless, the benefits 
derived from trade creation within imperial trading blocs are unlikely to have exceeded the costs of trade 
diversion, simply because disparities in political power between metropolitan and local authorities 
(included within European empires or commonwealths) normally attempted to promote com-
plementarity across economies, countervailed competition and maintained national and regional 
comparative advantages within historical and broadly static patterns of specialisation. More often than 
not systems of imperial preference operated to sustain Europe's traditional staple industries or segments 
of European agricultures that were inefficient compared to competitors from elsewhere in the world 
economy. At the same time some metropolitan populations (and especially French and Portuguese 
families) paid relatively high prices for the privilege of consuming food and raw materials from their 
colonies. Empires normally supported divergent but complementary patterns of interregional trade.83 
However politically constructed, as institutional frameworks for specialisation, they could not become 
as efficient for European growth and development as customs unions and free trade areas which 
sustained competition and lead to convergence and differentiated patterns of specialisation among 
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economies that are geographically contiguous, culturally homogeneous and not too dissimilar in 
structures and levels of industrial development. 84 
Unfortunately research in twentieth centwy business histoxy has not yet produced the samples 
of case studies required to test the proposition that the observed reallocation of metropolitan investment 
towards imperial (compared to domestic and foreign) locations may have generated sub-optimal returns 
for European economies. Extraordinaxy rates of profit certainly accrued to some British, French, Dutch, 
Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese companies engaged in prospecting for and the mining of minerals and 
crude oil. Cash crop plantations are another sector where European investors are perceived to have 
made supernormal profits. Examples of favourable leases and other contracts and concessions for land 
and mineral rights, under which European owned companies operated for several decades after 1914, 
often originated in political contexts of colonial governance and mandatoxy power. Nevertheless, 
comparable returns on investments in Asia, Africa and Southern America seem to have accrued to 
American, Swiss, German and other European companies and investors without the privileges (and the 
costs!) involved in formal imperial rule. As yet there is too little evidence that colonial power was 
directly and systematically used to secure "economic rents" for metropolitan capital placed in Europe's 
colonies, protectorates and dependencies. In the absence of hard statistics rates of profit earned on such 
capital might still be plausibly represented as "normal" for investments of comparable risk located 
within the borders of sovereign European and/or foreign states.8S 
Furthermore, once indigenous movements for colonial freedom emerged as serious threats to 
colonial rule and the military and political capacities of European states to resist had been undermined, 
by democratic antipathies towards empires, the risks (indeed the recorded losses) of European capital 
from violence and expropriation increased enormously.86 By mid centwy there were few places left 
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where European capitalists could depend for long on colonial authorities to help them obtain 
"exploitative" rates of profit. With decolonization under way, European governments concentrated 
(usually without success) upon securing compensation for the fixed assets that their nationals lost 
through forced transfers and nationalizations of property that followed almost everywhere from the end 
of empires. Whatever the flows of psychic or strategic benefits might have been there can be little doubt 
that the fiscal costs of maintaining imperial rule increased dramatically during and after the First World 
War. Burdens levied on metropolitan taxpayers to meet expenditures incurred by European states for 
the external defence, for the maintenance of internal order and for the economic and social development 
of their colonies and protectorates went up and up. 87 
Furthermore, such burdens could not be easily shared. Britain's dominions, to take one 
example, continued to resist pressures to contribute a greater share towards the costs of imperial 
defence. Mindful of the sacrifices that they had made during the First World War, London did not push 
that demand too hard Meanwhile, the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to restore the balance of power 
in Europe and the predatory intentions of Getmany, Italy and Japan towards the empires of Britain, 
France, Holland and Portugal in Africa and Asia became ominous and maintained expenditures to deter 
threats from external aggression at relatively high levels. British and French strategic planners became 
more aware, however (than they had been before 1914) of the tensions involved between the defence of 
homelands in Europe and the protection of far flung possessions against attacks from such potentially 
effective antagonists as Germany and Italy in Africa and Japan in Asia and the Pacific.88 
At the same time, and stimulated by Wilsonian ideals of self determination, Marxist theories of 
exploitation and older European ideas of democracy, movements for colonial freedom began to raise the 
costs of maintaining internal order, particularly in India but also in Africa. After the foundation of the 
League of Nations, "progressive" statesmen and colonial administrators saw European imperialism as 
entering a phase of responsibility for the economic and social development of indigenous peoples. 
B7 
BB 
Kopcban, The vunerability oj empire 
French, The British way ojwarjare 
30 
Ideas of trust, of mission, of mandate appeared and built upon older Christian traditions of paternalism 
towards backward and poorer peoples.89 Although colonial expenditures on infra-structural development 
and social welfare did not leap forward during the years offiscal constraint that followed the Great War, 
the sense that supranational responsibilities would inevitably cost European taxpayers real money, led to 
a new wave of questioning and writing on the theme of Do Empires Pay? With the spread of 
democracy in Europe people began to perceive and to vote on the assumption that they might not and a 
spate of reports by journalists and intellectuals exposing the costs, injustices and occasional brutalities of 
colonial rule strengthened their doubts about the value of the entire imperial enterprise.90 
5. Decolonization and the Malign Legacies of European Empires Overseas 
Global warfare from 1939-45 postponed discussions about the economic value of Europe's 
emprres. In the event the Axis powers suffered total defeat and lost, without compensation, all the 
national assets acquired through expenditures on conquest followed by years or (in the Italian case) 
decades of investment in facilities for defence and internal order, infrastructures, fixed capital fonnation 
in colonial agricultures, industry and services and expenditures upon the acculturation, training and 
education required by local workforces in order to establish productive and stable commercial 
relationships between a metropolis and its colonies overseas. Neither Italy nor Gennany (nor Japan) 
ever recouped more than a fraction of their investments in colonisation. There can be little doubt that, 
except perhaps in psychic terms, the accumulated material benefits accruing to Italian, German (and 
Japanese societies) from their engagement with empires overseas fell short of the costs of conquest and 
investment in colonial infrastructures by very large margins. Fortunately, their fiscal expenditures and 
public and private investments in colonies does not seem to have been massive and prolonged enough to 
have constrained their long tenn rates of economic growth to any significant degree. 
For other European countries, including France, Holland, Belgium and Portugal, with deeper 
traditions of colonisation and cultures penneated by imperialism, tendencies towards closer integration 
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of domestic and colonial economies overseas that had reappeared between the wars became even 
stronger and more popular and matured into one of the more malign political legacies of the Second 
World War.91 For example, the involvement of the French, Dutch and Portuguese states in fighting wars 
in order to reclaim and pacify their empires· from indigenous nationalist movements in Morocco, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Indo China, Indonesia, Congo, Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere outside Europe, 
turned out to be futile and very expensive. When all the accounts come in and the expenditures upon a 
long series oflate colonial rearguard actions fought by European armies and navies in Africa, Asia, the 
Middle East and the Pacific, will surely be represented as "all costs and no benefits". That conclusion 
will be reinforced when historians add to the unprofitable legacy of attempts at imperial renewal, 
quantified conjectures for the economic value of metropolitan property destroyed and expropriated by 
nationalist movements, as well as the costs of the disorder and depression that invariably affiicted 
former colonial economies for many years after their armed struggles to "seize" independence. (Algeria 
has now become simply the most dramatic case in point)92 
Given the size of its empire, the United Kingdom decolonized more cheaply than other imperial 
powers. Furthermore, Britain had also drawn far more heavily than any other European nations upon 
the resources of its empire and commonwealth to defeat Germany and (through the sterling area) to 
assist the home economy to recover after the Second World War.93 Nevertheless, the imperial 
contribution towards victory in Europe, the security of the realm and post war recovery needs to be 
compared with resources supplied to wage war by the kingdom itself: by Russia and other allies and 
above all by the United States. Historians might well regard any attempt to draw distinctions between 
imperial and national defence as moot, economists will realistically suggest that Britain's dominions and 
the colonies participated in a "virtual alliance" of quasi autonomous political units constructed and 
funded to protect their own independence and integrity against the predatory intentions of Germany and 
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Japan.94 If this "economistic representation" is valid, then the imperial contribution need not be depicted 
without as altruistic and important for the survival and continued development of Britain and France 
during the world wars of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the cultural legacy ofimperiaIism which 
gave credence and support to repeatedly reasserted claims for the material significance of empire might 
at the end of the century be represented as persistent constraint upon the adjustments required for the 
competitive vitality of the British economy.9S For example, the legacy of empire permeated the 
formulation of the kingdom's strategic fiscal, monetary and commercial policies in ways that retarded 
and hampered the adaptation of the economy to the realities ofintemational power and competition after 
1945.96 Only Portugal and, to a more limited extent, France seems to have been economically afllicted 
(and not to the same degree) by the cultural and political legacies of empire.97 
How economically superior modern history might have turned out for Britain and the rest of 
imperial Europe if Cobden's and Hobson's recommendations for decoupling from empires had occurred 
in the late nineteenth rather than at the end of this turbulent century? Meanwhile, the thrust of our essay 
has been concerned to challenge, the widespread perception that European economies made gains from 
conquest and colonisation in Africa, Asia and Southern America that were somehow indispensable or at 
least hugely significant for their long term. development. 
In conclusion it may be interesting to offer some speculations as to why imperialism turned out 
to be less than profitable for several European states most actively and consistently involved in 
expansion and enterprise overseas? 
Since European governments together with private investors persisted with various forms of 
colonial rule on and off for nearly five centuries, it must be the case that they believed that their policies 
and actions would pay. With hindsight, historians can now suggest that time and again statesmen, 
generals, admirals, projectors, entrepreneurs and investors involved in the promotion of Europe's 
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imperialistic enterprises overseas llilderestimated the expenditures and risks involved Costs of conquest 
often turned out to be much greater than first anticipated. Prospects for loot and plllilder promoted 
ventures overseas and could produce immediate and sometimes large gains. Nevertheless the 
pacification and persistent coercion of native POI>ulations overseas denuded the economic basis for long 
term exploitation of the natural resources, tradeable commodities and markets that Europeans hoped to 
turn into flows of material benefits for themselves, their societies and their power within the 
international order of competing states.98 
Furthermore, and until very late in the day, European governments, merchants and 
businessmen failed to invest at anywhere near the levels required in the infrastructural facilities and 
human capital formation in order to ensure that their political rule over colonial populations, natural 
resources and under-exploited assets in Africa, Asia, and South America became really profitable. 
North America was another story but the discovery and exploitation of that sub continent crowded out 
European investment elsewhere in the world economy. 
Meanwhile, and for two reasons, the costs of rule (including coercion and the extension of 
incentives designed to secure collaboration between the colonised and the colonisers) increased through 
time. Even among the more ruthless of imperial states, capacities for control remained geographically, 
politically and economically constrained by the resources and instruments for the exercise of power at 
their disposal. When the technologies for stronger more intrusive government gradually improved, they 
faced growing resistance from nationalistic movements for colonial freedom which raised the costs of 
coercion within empires and also at home within the metropolis.99 
Local resistance certainly mattered particularly when it came to time to depart and when the 
reluctance to leaving by some European governments inflicted a fmal round of heavy costs upon several 
metropolitan economies. Finally, throughout the five centuries or more of European expansion 
overseas, the context of great power politics within which imperialism occurred promoted rivalry, 
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mercantilism and warfare among the states which is perhaps the major reason why the potential gains to 
Europe from overseas expansion, colonisation and trade were dissipated and at this end of the twentieth 
century look so disappointing. 
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